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MASS MURDERERS DISCOVER MASS MURDER: 
THE GERMANS AND KATYN, 1943 
Kenneth F. Ledford' 
After the German anny in 1943 discovered the graves of murdered 
Polish army officers in the Katyn Forest, Joseph Goebbels embarked upon a 
cynical publicity campaign to spread before the world the perils of 
Bolshevik success. But the Nazi discovery of Soviet crimes against leaders 
of Polish state and society elided the reality that from the very beginning of 
the German invasion of Poland, the SS had carried out identical mass 
murders of Polish intellectuals and other social leaders. Goebbels 's 
campaign amounted to mass murderers "uncovering" mass murders on the 
part of their adversaries and seeking cynically to use that "shocking" 
discove1y to the advantage of the Third Reich. This essay situates the Nazi 
campaign to mobilize the Katyn discovery to German advantage in three 
steps. First, it sketches the events leading up to the Katyn massacre in April 
1940 and the Nazi discovery of the victims in late March 1943. Second, it 
examines the course and substance, as well as the immediate consequences 
of Nazi propaganda exploitation of the Katyn massacre to promote 
Goebbels 's ends. And third, it adverts to the impact of that propaganda 
campaign on the Allied war effort, on the Polish government in exile in 
London, and thus on the course of wartime and post-war Cold War history. 
To conclude, it situates Katyn in the bloody twentieth-centwy histmy of 
Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine as the cockpit of genocide that Timothy 
Snyder has called the "Bloodlands. " 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 9, 1943, Joseph Goebbels exulted in his diary: 
Polish mass graves have been found near Smolensk. The Bolsheviks 
simply shot down and then shoveled into mass graves some 1 0,000 Polish 
prisoners, among them civilian captives, bishops, intellectuals, artists, et 
cetera .... Gruesome aberrations of the human soul were thus revealed . .I 
saw to it that the Polish mass graves be inspected by neutral journalists 
from Berlin. I also had Polish intellectuals taken there. They are to see for 
themselves what is in store for them should their wish that the Germans be 
defeated by the Bolsheviks actually be fulfilled. 1 
Goebbels resolved to incorporate this grisly discovery into his ongoing 
"anti-Bolshevik" propaganda focus of the late winter and spring of 1943, 
which aimed to distract attention from the reeling retreat of the Wehnnacht 
in the east after the cmshing defeat at Staling~·ad in February and the Afrika 
Korps in North Africa.2 He saw a chance to use this news to address three 
audiences: the Polish population in the "General-Govemment;" the western 
Allies of the Soviet Union, Britain and the U.S.; and the increasingly 
pessinlistic Gennan population in a campaign of "Strength through Fear" 
(Kraft durch Furcht). 3 
Goebbels embarked upon a publicity campaig11 to spread before the 
world the perils of Bolshevik success: "One hardly dares to imagine what 
would happen to Gennany and Europe if this Asiatic-Jewish flood were to 
inundate our country and our continent. All hands must be put to work to 
the last breath to prevent such a misfortune."" He undertook a multi-pronged 
propaganda campaig11 to unearth the facts about the murdered Polish 
officers uncovered in the Katyn Forest, and he framed a nanative that aimed 
to disrupt the Allied war effort against Nazi Germany. But Goebbels failed 
in his primary goal of driving a wedge between the western Allies and the 
Soviet Union. And the entire propaganda campaign embodied a cynicism 
1 
TilE GOEBBELS DIARIES l 942-J 943, at 3 J 8 (Louis P. Loclmer ed., J 948). 
2 
See lAY W. BAIRD, THE MYTHICAL WORLD OF NAZI WAR PROPAGANDA 1939-1945, at 
194, 196-97, 199 (1974) (discussing Goebbels's propaganda campaigns). 
3 
John P. Fox, Der Fall Katynzmd die Propaganda des NS-Regimes [The Karyn Massacre 
and the Propaganda of the Nazi Regime], 39 V!ERTELJAHRSHEFTE FOR ZE!TGESCHICHTE 
[CONTEMP. HIST. Q.] 462, 468 (1982); Claudia Weber, Wider besseres Wissen. Das Schweig-
en der Westalliierlen zu Katyn [Against Better Judgment: The Silence of the West em Allies 
Regarding Katyn], 0STEUROPA: DER HITLER-STALIN-PAKT DER KRIEG UNO DIE EUROPAISCHE 
ERJNNERUNG [EASTEP...l'~ EUROPE: THE J-liTLER-STALIN PACT - THE VVAR AND EA~TEI{N 
EUROPEAN MEMORY), .July-Aug. 2009, at 227,227-28 (2009). 
4 
THE GOEBBELS DIARIES, supra note 1, at 331. 
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breathtaking even for Goebbels, for the Nazi "discovery" of Soviet crimes 
against leadership segments of Polish state and society elided the reality that 
from the very beginning of the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 
1939, Action Groups (Einsatzgruppen) of the SS carried out mass murders 
of Polish intellectuals and other social leaders identical to the Soviet crime 
that the Wehrmacht uncovered at Katyn. Goebbels's campaign amounted to 
mass murderers "uncovering" mass murders on the part of their adversaries 
and seeking cynically to use that "shocking" discovery to the advantage of 
the Third Reich. 5 
This essay will situate the Nazi campaign to instrumentalize the 
Katyn discovery to German advantage in three steps. First, it will sketch the 
events leading up to the Katyn massacre in April 1940 and the Nazi 
discovery of the victims in late March 1943. Second, it will examine the 
course, substance, and immediate consequences of Nazi propaganda 
exploitation of the Katyn massacre to promote Goebbels's ends, and advert 
to the impact of that propaganda campaign on the Allied war effort, on the 
Polish government in exile in London, and thus ·on the course of wartime 
and post-war Cold War history. Finally, it will position Katyn in the bloody 
twentieth-century history of east-central Europe as the cockpit of genocide 
that Timothy Snyder has called the "Bloodlands."6 
5 The English- and German-language scholarship on Katyn is enormous. Perspectives and 
arguments necessarily have changed over time, as the documentary resource base expanded 
both with the elimination of suspicions about Nazi publications, first by the investigations of 
the Select Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1952, and then by the all too 
brief opening of the former Soviet archives and the acknowledgment of the murder by M i-
khail Gorbachev in 1990. Useful works consulted for this essay include: JANUSZ K. 
ZAWODNY, DEATH IN THE FOREST: THE STORY OF THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE (1962); 
ALLEN PAUL, KATYN: THE UNTOLD STORY OF STALIN'S POLISH MASSACRE (1991); ALLEN 
PAUL, KATYN: STALIN'S MASSACRE AND THE TRIUMPH OF TRUTH (2010) [hereinafter PAUL, 
T!uuMPH OF TRUTH]; FRANZ-ANTON !<ADELL, DIE KATYN LUGE: GESCHlCHTE EINER 
MANIPULATION. FAKTEN, DOKUMENTE UND ZEUGEN [THE KATYN LIE: HISTORY OF A 
MANiPULATION: FACTS, DOCUMENTS AND WITNESSES] (1991); GERD KAISER, KArYN: DAS 
STAA TSVERBRECHEN- DAS STAA TSGEHEIMNIS [KA TYN: THE STATE CRIME THE STATE SECRET] 
(2002); GEORGE SANFORD, KATYN AND THE SOVIET MASSACRE OF 1940: TRUTH, JUSTICE, AND 
MEMORY (2005); VICTOR ZASLAVSKY, KLASSENSAUBERUNG: DAS MASSAKER VON KATYN 
[CLASS CLEANSING: THE MASSACRE OF KATYN] (Rita SeuB trans., 2007); MARTIN SCHAUBS, 
STREITFALL KATYN: DIE WAHRNEHMUNG DES MASSAKERS IN DER SOWJETRUSSJSCHEN, 
POLNISCHEN UND WESTDEUTSCHEN 0FFENTLICHKEIT 1980-2000 [KATYN DISPUTE: THE 
PERCEPTION OF THE MASSACRE IN THE SOVIET, POLISH AND WEST GERMAN PUBLIC 1980-
2000] (2008); EUGENIA MARESCH, KATYN 1940: THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF THE 
WEST'S BETRAYAL (2010). 
6 TIMOTHY SNYDER, BLOODLANDS: EUROPE BETWEEN HITLER AND STALIN (2010). 
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ll. THEIVIASSACRE ATKATYN AND THE NAZI D1SCOVERY 
Timothy Snyder's persuasive new synthesis of the history of east-
central Europe h"'1 the middle of the twentieth centmy argues that the region 
from central Poland to western Russia (through Uhaine, Belarus, and the 
Baltic States) experienced a coordinated orgy of political mass murder from 
1932-33 until the end of the war in 1945, and oppression thereafter until 
Stalin's death in 1953, a horror whose extent and enon11Jty has been over-
shadowed by accmmts of the focused murder of Jews in the Holocaust. 7 
Cunent scholarship thus rightly retu.rns the murder of the Polish intellectual 
and social elite in the professional and reserve officer corps at Katyn and 
elsewhere to its integral place as an episode within three decades of 
criminality. Katyn's recontextualization not only settles long-open 
arguments about its facts, but also explains better how it could have 
occuned. Snyder details in excruciating clarity Soviet enmity toward Poles 
and Poland that extended back to the Polish-Soviet War of 1920-21, 
Stalin's focus on the murder of Polish citizens of the Soviet Union during 
the Great Purge of 1937-38, and the eagemess of the Soviets to extend their 
border westward at the expense of Poland that led to the Hitler-Stalin Pact 
in 1939.8 Tllis broadened context also clarifies how the NKVD enjoyed 
literally millions of opportunities to perfect the logistical and bureaucratic 
techniques necessmy to render individualized mass murder by pistol shot to 
the nape of the neck both efficient and expeditious. 9 
The more iinmediate context of the Katyn massacre, of course, was 
the successive invasions of Poland by Nazi Ge1many and the Soviet Union 
in September 1939. After the conclusion of the Hitler-Stalin Pact it1 
Moscow on August 23, the Gennan invasion of Poland on the night of 
August 31 -September 1 was a foregone conclusion. 10 But the Soviet 
invasion of Poland :li"om the east on September 17--clandestinely agreed to 
7 ld at vii-xi. 
8 
I d. at 89-107 (giving the total number of Poles murdered as 85,000); see also James 
Morris, The Polish Terror: Spy Mania and Ethnic Cleansing in the Great Terror, 56 EuR.-
AsiA STUD. 751, 760 (2004) (arguing that between August 11, 1937 and November 1938, the 
NKVD murdered 111,091 Polish citizens of the Soviet Union, mostly on false accusations of 
being spies for the Polish government or members of the "Polish Military Organization," 
which had been dissolved in 1921 at the end of the Polish-Soviet War). See generally PIOTR 
WANDYCZ, POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1917-1921 (J 969) (providing a definitive account of 
the Polish-Soviet War). 
9 SNYDER, supra note 6, at 83-84 (describing the execution process developed during the 
Great Purge and applied during the killings at Katyn Forest). 
1
° For the definitive works on the outbreak of WWII, see GERHARD L. WEINBERG, 
HITLER'S FOREIGN POLICY: THE ROAD TO WORLD WAR II 1933-1939, at 943 (2005; GERHARD 
L. WEINBERG, A WORLD AT ARMs: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR ll, at 54 (2d ed. 
2005). 
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in the "Secret Additional Protocol"-revealed the broader extent of the 
Nazi-Soviet alliance. 11 On September 28, their conquests complete, Foreign 
Ministers Ribbentrop and Molotov signed the. German-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation, and Demarcation, modifying the previously 
agreed-upon territorial division, extending the western border of the Soviet 
Union westward into interwar Poland, and delivering at least 100,000 Polish 
prisoners of war into Soviet captivity, including the officers who died at 
Katyn.I2 
But from the very beginning of their own invasion of Poland, the 
Nazis had planned mass murder of Poles. Hitler had instructed his army 
commanders on AugUst 22 that "the annihilation of Poland is in the 
foreground. The goal is the elimination of the living forces, not the 
attainment of a certain line."13 So troops of the German Wehrmacht killed 
Polish soldiers who had surrendered, murdered civilians, raped, and 
plundered. But Nazi racial fixation on elimination of "inferior races," 
including Poles, had also led to the organization of SS "Action Groups" to 
accompany the army into Poland, although with the different mission of 
decapitating Polish society by murdering Polish intelligentsia as well as 
Jews, a plan called "Operation Tannenberg."14 Before the dissolution of 
these units on November 20, by which point German-occupied Poland had 
been "pacified," they had murdered at least 42,000-50,000 Poles. 15 All of 
11 WWII Behind Closed Doors: Stalin, The Nazis And The West - Nazi-Soviet Non-
Aggression Pact with Secret Protocols, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/pdfs/ 
NonAggressionPact.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2012); see also BOHDAN NAHAYLO & VICTOR 
SWOBODA, SOVIET DISUNION: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM IN THE USSR 82-
83 (1990). 
12 See SANFORD, supra note 5, at 21 (noting the territorial exchanges of the Friendship 
Treaty). 
13 KLAUS-MICHAEL MALLMANN, JOCHEN BOHLER, & JORGEN MATTHJ..US, EINSATZGRUPPEN 
IN POLEN. DARSTELLUNG UND DOKUMENTATION [ACTION GROUPS IN POLAND: DESCRIPTION 
AND DOCUMENTATION] 54 (2008); see also SNYDER, supra note 6, at 121 ("As the chief of 
staff summarized, it was 'the intention of the Leader to destroy and exterminate the Polish 
people.'") 
14 Dorothee Weitbrecht, Ermiichtigung zur Vernichtung: Die Einsatzgruppen in Polen im 
Herbst 1939 [Authorization for Annihilation: The Action Groups in Poland in Autumn 1939], 
in GENESIS DES GENOZIDS: POLEN 1939-1941 [GENESIS OF GENOCIDE: POLAND 1939-1941], at 
57 (Klaus-Michael Mallmann & Bogdan Musial eds., 2004). 
15 For a discussion of the dissolution of the Einsatzg711ppen, see id. at 68. For the figure of 
50,000 killed in Poland by the Einsatzgruppen and their ethnic German auxiliaries, see 
ALEXANDER B. ROSSINO, HITLER STRIKES POLAND: BLITZKRIEG, IDEOLOGY, AND ATROCITY 
234 (2003). Rossino prefers a lower estimate of 42,000 and adds that some 7,000 of those 
killed were Jews. !d. at 300, n.l7. After November 1939, the Order Police replaced the 
Einsatzgruppen and continued the killing by implementing harsh retaliation for instance of 
Polish attack or resistance to German policy. EDWARD B. WESTERMANN, HITLER's POLICE 
BATIALIONS: ENFORCING RACIAL WAR IN THE EAST 143-45 (2005) (discussing the atrocity at 
the town of Ostrow on November 11, 1939). See generally PmLLIP T. RUTHERFORD, PRELUDE 
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this murder, of course was only prelude to massive Nazi plans to conduct 
ethnic cleansing of Poles in the Warthegau by expelling them to the east to 
provide empty farmland on which to resettle Gennans. 16 
Thus, when the Soviets in September 1939 began to anest, deport, 
and execute Polish intellectuals in their occupied zone of Poland, their 
policy diff~red i..~ no way from that of the Ge1wans in Poland to the west. 
These Soviet purges and murders of Poles as Poles merely continued the 
murders of the Great Purge, and Soviet policy toward officers among the 
Polish prisoners of war culminated in the murders at Katyn and other sites 
in the spring of 1940. Together, they show neither any new departure in 
Soviet policy nor any difference from Nazi policy. But, of course, the 
framework situation and the line-up of interests changed radically when the 
Gennans invaded the Soviet Union with Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 
1941.17 Suddenly, the Soviets became not only the allies of the B1itish, but 
also of the Polish govenunent-in-exile in London, which had a vital interest 
in the whereabotlts of the 1939 PO'lils, as did the British, desperate for 
troops to put into battle against the Germans. The complex story of the 
fruitless and frustrating Polish diplomatic efforts of mid-1941 to leam the 
whereabouts of some 18,000 Polish officers in Soviet hands lies beyond the 
scope of this essay, but it kept a focus on their fate. 18 
Conversely, the Gennan invasion of the Soviet Union turned 
erstvvhile allies and accomplices into enemies. The lightning German 
advance toward Moscow reached beyond Smolensk in late July 1941, 
behind schedule but still remarkably swift. Secme in the rear, Signal 
Regiment 53 7 of Anny Group Center set up its operations near a bend in the 
Dnieper River west of Smolenslc at a wood called Katyn, near a train station 
called Gniesdowo. 19 h1 November 1941, Colonel FriedTich Ahrens anived 
TO THE FINAL SOLUTION: THE NAZI PROGRAi'vl FOR DEPORTING ETHNIC POLES, 1939-1941 
(2007) (discussing the German policy toward deportation of Poles). 
16 See CATHERINE A. EPSTEIN, MODEL NAZI: ARTHUR GREISER AND THE OCCUPATION OF 
WESTERl'l POLAND 176 (2010) (discussing the history of Nazi policy against the Poles in the 
Warthegau). 
17 For a thorough analysis of the Barbarossa invasion, and its effect on Soviet policy, see 
.A..L.".N CLAJUC, BARBA.'WSSA; THE RUSSIAN-GERMAN CONFLICT 1941-1945 (1965). 
18 The authoritative scholarly treatment of Polish government efforts to detennine the 
whereabouts, and later the fate, of Polish POWs in Soviet captivity is in SANFORD, supra 
note 5. Sanford's argument is presented in shorter form in George Sanford, The Katyn A1as-
sacre and Polish-Soviet Relations, 1941-43, 41 J. CONTEMP. HI sT. 95 (2006). 
19 
The testimony of Colonel Ahrens can be found in 17 INT,L Jv1IL1TARY TRIBUNAL, THE 
T!uAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMiNALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL SITIING AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY, 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946, 275-
97 (1946) [hereinafter NUREMBURG TRIAL PROCEEDINGS], as we!! as in The Katyn Forest 
J11assacre: Hearings Before the Select Comm. to Conduct an investigation of the Facts, Evi-
dence and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest lvlassacre on the Investigation of the Jl1urder of' 
Thousands of Polish Officers in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, Russia, 82nd Cong. 2nd 
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to command the regiment_Z0 During the summer of 1942, Polish workers in 
the Katyn forest heard rumors that the Soviets had murdered their Polish 
countrymen nearby. On their own time, they excavated human remains and 
marked the spot with a wooden cross, but they did not report their discovery 
to the German authorities?1 Colonel Ahrens later recalled that during the 
winter of 1943, in January or February, he tracked a wolf through the 
woods, discovered scratchings on the mound with the wooden cross, 
directed investigations as to the kind of bones contained in the mound, and 
was informed by doctors that they were human.22 Colonel Ahrens reported 
this discovery to Army Group Center in late Februmy 1943, which 
dispatched Professor Dr. Gerhard Buhtz, a forensic pathologist formerly 
Professor of Forensic Pathology and Criminology at the University of 
Breslau, and currently on the medical staff of the Army Group, to 
investigate. 23 
On March 1, Buhtz began to plan the exhumation and autopsy of 
the remains, but the harsh freeze of winter delayed the actual start of work 
until March 29.24 By the time of an interim report on April 10, in a single 
grave, workers had uncovered twelve layers of some 250 corpses each, for a 
total of at least 3,000 dead.25 Of 100 corpses, sixty-five had been identified 
by means of identity cards, diaries or letters in their pockets, or otherwise, 
thirty-nine of which clearly were Polish mmy officers. 26 Excavation 
continued through June 1 at seven graves, resulting in the discovery of 
4,143 corpses, of whom 2,815 had been clearly identified; further, the 
clothing of the dead was plainly recognizable as Polish army unifonns. 27 
Sess. 1287-1303 (1952) [hereinafter Katyn Hearings]. The chronology of discovery and 
investigation described in this essay relies heavily upon Fox, supra note 3. 
20 NUREMBURG TRIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 19, at 276. 
21 AUSWARTIGES AMT [FOREIGN OFFICE], AMTLICHES MATERIAL ZUM MASSENMORD VON 
KATYN [OFFICIAL MATERIALS ON THE MASS MURDER OF KATYN] 25 (1943) (including 
testimony ofP. Kisseljeff dated February 27, 1943). 
22 NUREMBURG TRIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 19, at 282. 
23 KAISER, supra note 5, at 160 (indicating that Buhtz had served since 1938 as Director of 
the Institute for Forensic Medicine and Criminology at the University of Breslau, and had 
gained experience earlier in autopsies at German concentration camps (citing ERNST KLEE, 
DEUTSCHE MEDIZIN IM DRITTEN REICH [GERMAN MEDICINE IN THE THIRD REICH] 236 
(2001))). 
24 See Fox, supra note 3, at 462-63. For the report of the leading forensic expert, Professor 
Dr. Gerhard Buhtz, on the excavations at Katyn, see AuswARTIGES AMT, supra note 21, at 
38-94. 
25 Ausw ARTIGES AMT, supra note 21, at 32. 
26 I d. at 32-33. 
27 Jd. at 33-36 (explaining distribution of dead soldiers by ranlc as follows: Generals 2; 
Colonels 12; Lieutenants Colonels 50; Majors 165; Captains 440; First Lieutenants 542; and 
Second Lieutenants 930). 
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Although news of the discovery initially remained within the chain oJ 
command of the Wehrmacht and the Feldpolizei, by early Ap1il, the wore 
had reached the Reichspropaganda Ministry in Berlin, where Goebbel~ 
learned of it on April I or 2.28 
Goebbels recognized the prime propaganda opportunity and 
detem1ined to exploit it carefully. Before announcing the discovery to the 
world, he arranged for a delegation of Polish leaders to fly from Warsaw, 
Krakow, and Lublin to Smolensk on April 10, where they were taken to the 
Katyn Forest and shown two excavations from which 250 bodies had 
already been e:;Jmmed.29 The next day, Goebbels's public propaganda effort 
began with a first mention of the discovery of the graves by the Gem1an 
news agency Trans-Ocean, evoking a reply in a pro-Soviet Polish-language 
radio broadcast from Moscow, but world media first paid attention after a 
broadcast communique on Berlin radio on April 13 described the discovery 
in "a place in which the Bolsheviks had secretly perpetrated mass 
executions and where the GPU had murdered 10,000 Polish officers."30 The 
Soviets on Ap1il 15 denied their guilt, denouncing the "vile fabrications by 
Ge1man-Fascist murderers," and the Polish Government on April 17 issued 
a statement of grave concern that condemned the murders, denounced 
Gennan hypocrisy in consideration of Gennan crimes against Poland and 
Poles, and called upon the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) to investigate at the site. 31 
Although the Gennans quicldy agreed to the Polish proposal for an 
ICRC investigation, that body conditioned its involvement on the invitation 
of all states involved, and the certaiJ1ty that the Gennans would never invite 
28 
Fox, supra note 3, at 465 (based upon testimony that an official in the Ministry of Prop-
aganda, Werner Stephan, provided to the House Select Committee on April 21, 1952); see 
Katyn Hearings, supra note 19, at 1246-49. 
29 
PAUL, TRJUMPH OF TRUTH, supra note 5, at 215 (citing to Part 6 of the 1952 Katyn Hear-
ings, supra note 19). 
30 
I(A n'N: A C!u-JV!E WITHOUT PUNISHMENT 216 (A1ma M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva 
& Wojciech Materski eds., Marian Schwartz, Anna M. Cienciala & Maia A. Kipp trans., 
2007). This work reproduces the Ap1il 13 communique in English as Document 101. I d. at 
305-06. 
31 
Jd. at 306-07 (presenting Document 102 titled "Conununique Issued by the Sovinform-
buro Attacking the Gennan 'Fabrications' about the Graves of the Polish Officers in Kat}'n 
Forrest"); id. at 308-09 (presentin.g Document 103 titled "Statement of the Polish Govern-
ment Concerning the Discovery of the Graves of Polish Officers near Smolensk). Poles Ask 
lnquhy in Soviet 'Murders,' N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1943, at A4 (quoting the Polish War Min-
ister, Lieutenant General Marjan Kulciel, as calling for an ICRC investigation as to the fate of 
10,000 otlicers among 181,000 POWs and further providing remarkably accurate figures of 
4,500 officers at the POW camp in Kozielsk, 3,800 at Starobyelsk, and 380 at Ostashlcovo). 
The Katyn Massacre, of course, included the officers from the Kozielsk camp. 
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the Soviets blocked that investigative route. 32 The Polish Red Cross, under 
German pressure in the General-Government and despite reservations and 
concerns about being used for German propaganda purposes, sent a four-
member Technical Commission, together with its Secretary, to Katyn on 
April 14.33 Augmented by additional members on April 19, it worked on site 
~til June 7, after which it produced its final report. 34 Alongside the teams 
of Buhtz and the Polish Red Cross, a third group of experts worked at 
Katyn, an International Physicians Commission invited by the Germans and 
consisting of forensic pathologists from twelve German allies or states 
occupied by Gennany, seven of whom conducted autopsies on the exhumed 
corpses between April 28-30, 1943.35 Thus, although some work at the site 
continued until June, by the end of April, the essential facts had been 
framed. It is to the propaganda effort to have them believed and to shape 
their effect that I now turn. 
32 Daniel T. Brigham, Massacre Inquiry Depends on Soviet, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 24, 1943, at 
A4 (quoting the ICRC communique as stating that it would name a commission of neutral 
experts "only if requested to do so 'by all parties concerned' and then only under the terms of 
its memorandum to the belligerents of Sept. 12, 1939"). That memorandum enunciated three 
principles to guide its actions where its intervention was requested for action on violations of 
international conventions: I) the ICRC will not serve as an investigating commission or 
arbitration tribunal; 2) the ICRC will limit its participation in such investigations or arbitra-
tions to the selection of one or more competent persons to lead it; and 3) the ICRC cannot 
proceed "except by virtue of a special mandate confided in advance under a specific conven-
tion or by virtue of an accord ad hoc"). !d. For the impact of the request for ICRC investiga-
tion, see P .M.H. Bell, Censorship, Propaganda and Public Opinion: The Case of the Katyn 
Graves, 1943, 39 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. Soc'y 63, 64-65 {1989); MICHAEL BALFOUR, 
PROPAGANDA IN WAR 1939-1945: ORGANISATIONS, POLICIES AND PUBLICS IN BRITAIN AND 
GERMANY 332 {1979); SANFORD, supra note 5, at 129-30. 
33 See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 30, at 311-14 
34 For the report of the Secretary, see id. For the report of the Teclmical Commission, see 
id. at 314-19. For the report of Dr. Marian Wodzinski, see MARESCH, supra note 5, at 85-
104, 108-19. For the report ofKazimierz Skarzynski, see id. at 76-84, 120-41. 
35 For the opinion of the international experts, see "Protokoll der Intel?iationalen Aerz-
tekommission," [Minutes of the International Commission of Physicians], in AuswARTIGES 
AMT, supra note 21, at 114-18. These physicians came from Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Mora-
via, Rumania, Slovakia, and Switzerland. They rendered the unanimous opinion that all the 
bodies they examined had been shot in the head, most in the back of the neck, and that the 
date of death was in the months of March and April1940. I d. at 118. Also reproduced are the 
protocols of autopsies conducted by seven of the eleven commission members, "Obduk-
tionsbefunde der Professoren: Orsos, Tramsen, Palmieri, Markov, Hajek, Miloslavich, Birlc-
le." [Autopsy Reports of the Professors: Orso, Tramsen, Palmieri, Markov, Hajek, Miloslav-
ich,Birlde]Jd. at 118-35. 
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lll. THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AND ITS IMPACT 
Goebbels sought to exploit the Katyn discovery as part of h 
"propaganda of pessimism" that he had begun after Stalingrad, perhaps be. 
immortalized in his February 18, 1943 "Do you want total war?" speech i 
the Berlin Sportpalast. 36 I11 doing so, he sought to address three audience: 
(1) the Poles of the General-Govemment, in an effort to mobilize them t 
side with the Gennans in defense against the onrushing Red Anny; (2) tl1 
westem Allies, in an effort to sow dissension between them and their Sovi( 
ally on the already contentious issue of post-war Poland, to undennine th 
recently mmounced policy of unconditional sunender, and to open th 
possibility of a separate peace with one side or the other; and finaliy (3) th 
Gennan people, to steel them for increased defensive effort by instilling i, 
them fear of the consequences of a Soviet victory. In addressing these thre 
audiences, Goebbels intended to raise Gennan morale after the defeats o 
the winter, to strengthen Gennan resolve to resist the Soviets and increas' 
unity behind Nazi leadership, and at least to divide the Polish govemmen 
from the Soviets if not win them to the Gennans.37 But in addressing thes1 
audiences and pursuing these goals, Goebbels faced three problems: Polis] 
suspicion ofGennan intentions, Allied distrust ofthe Gennans' truthfulnes: 
and the credibility and popularity of the Soviets among their populations 
and the preliminary and sometimes embarrassing infom1ation that th( 
Germans had to propagate. 
Goebbels began with a press campaign to vilify the Soviets anc 
deepen the Nazi rhetorical motif that equated Bolshevism and Jews. The 
Nazi newspaper the Volkischer Beobachter resounded with miicles titled 
"The Mass Murder ofKatyn: The Work of Jewish Butchers," and "Judah'5 
Blood Guilt Grows to the Unfathomable."38 He worked with care to include 
gruesome footage of the exlmmations and autopsies in the weeldy newsreels 
and expressed his frustration when the anny prevailed in excluding the shots 
out of concem for the feelings of famj]ies of German soldiers reported to be 
1nissing or captured.39 He succeeded in screening widely a documentary 
film, lm Walde von Katyn. 40 The Gennan Foreign Office contributed by 
releasing in falll943 a massive book-length publication Amtliches ll1aterial 
zum Jlfassenmord von Katyn, 331 pages long and consisting of affidavits, 
reports, photographs, and a detailed listing by name of 4,143 dead recovered 
36 
For the "propaganda of pessimism," see BAIRD, supra note 2, at 197. For Goebbe1s's 
speech, see BALFOUR, supra note 32, at 322-23. 
37 
DAVID WELCH, THE THIRD REICH: POLITICS AND PROPAGANDA 113 (1993). 
38 Fox, supra note 3, at 464. 
39 
ARISTOTLE .A .. KALLIS, NAZI PROPAGANDA AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR i 56 (2005). 
40 
See DAVID WELCH, THE THIRD REICH: POLITICS AND PROPAGANDA 143-144 (2d ed. 
2002). 
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at Katyn before the German retreat in late September 1943.41 An undated 
propaganda pamphlet of uncertain. origin, ~u~ clearly ~o~ 1943, 
reproducing the report of the InternatiOnal Phystctans Commtsston and a 
collection of stark photographs from the site, concluded that: 
The chapter of Katyn is closed. It will live on as the greatest and most 
brutal mass murder in world history, but it is only one, albeit an especially 
gruesome case of Jewish-Bolshevik practice of murder. ... Katyn is a 
dreadful textbook example of what Bolshevism, with the silent support of 
England and America, would do in Europe, if Bolshevism and its Jewish 
executioners were to succeed in penetrating into the West and inundating 
the civilized lands of Europe. If that were to happen, the mass grave of 
tomorrow would no longer be called Katyn, but rather Europe. 42 
On one level, this propaganda effort paid dividends, and Goebbels 
certainly took credit for success. When the Polish government's request for 
an ICRC investigation coincided in time with that of the German 
government, Stalin took the opportunity to denounce the Poles as Nazi 
collaborators and to sever diplomatic relations with the government-in-exile 
on April 25, 1943, a step he had already decided to take.43 But the British 
government's primary goal all along was to prevent the discovery of this 
mass murder of Poles from damaging Anglo-Soviet relations.44 The 
behavior of Britain and the U.S., both of whom quickly concluded that the 
· Soviets-despite their denials-had committed this crime, consistently 
subordinated the interests of justice and truth for the Polish victims at Katyn 
to those of maintaining the wartin1e alliance until the ftnal defeat of the 
Germans.45 The title of one recent article best describes their position: 
"Against Better Knowledge: The Silence of the Western Allies about 
Katyn."46 And ironically, the accommodating attitudes of Britain and the 
U.S. helped to persuade Stalin not to seek a separate peace with the Nazis, a 
41 AUSWARTIGES AMT, supra note 21. 
42 DER MASSENMORD IM WALDE VON KATYN: EIN TATSACHENBERICHT AUF GRUND 
AMTLJCHER UNTERLAGEN [THE MASS MURDER IN THE FOREST OF KATYN: A FACTUAL REPORT 
BASED ON PUBLIC DOCUMENTS] (1943). 
43 The Note from Molotov to Polish Ambassador Tadeusz Romer dated April25, 1943 is 
printed in KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 30, at 309. See Fox, supra 
note 3, at 483; Raymond Daniell, Allies Work to End Soviet-Polish Rift, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 29, 
1943, at 1 (detailing the back-down of the Polish government and efforts by Britain and the 
U.S. to intervene in Moscow to restore Polish-Soviet relations). 
44 PAUL, TRIUMPH OF TRUTH, supra note 5, at 306--07. 
45 !d. at 304--18 (outlining the various techniques used by British and American forces to 
cover-up the Russian's crime to preserve the political wartime alliance). 
46 Weber, supra note 3. This subordination of Polish interests in a fair investigation of 
Katyn by Britain and the U.S. to interests of maintaining a solid Allied front with the Soviets 
explains the tone of outraged betrayal that colors much of the literature on Katyn. See, e.g., 
SANFORD, supra note 5, at 157--93; MAREscH, supra note 5, at 146--48. 
588 CASE W. RES. J. .iJ'U'L L. [Vol. 44:57 
viable option for him between the victories at Stalingi·ad in February and a 
Kursk in July. 47 
The German effort to use of the Katyn massacre to scare Poles int< 
joint defense against the Soviets so completely failed that it ground to a hal 
in June 1943, but not before twelve million brochures and twenty millim 
fliers had been distributed.48 There was no need to propagandize Poles tc 
resist Bolshevism or the Soviet Union, but the chaotic and murderous racia 
policies inside the Gerieral-Govermuent, against which even its GovemoJ 
Hans FranJc complained, rendered the Gennans unpersuasive allies for Pole~ 
fightL."'J.g for the freedom of their nation .. 19 For the Poles, as for the British 
the Americans, and the ICRC, Nazi propaganda carried little credibility 
even as the evidence of Soviet responsibility for Katyn grew and grew. "The 
crimes of the Gennans discredited Goebbels in his role as umnasker o] 
Stalinist mass murder. "50 
Only ·with the Gennan people did Goebbels's propaganda oi 
pessimism succeed. _A series of recent histories of 1945 has focused on the 
cataclysmic murderousness ofthe months January-May 1945, during which 
the Gennan Wehnnacht suffered one-quarter of its total killed during the 
entire war; more German soldiers died in those four months than dming all 
of 1942 and 1943 combined.51 Gennan civilian and soldier alike bore the 
burdens of the bombing campaign and invasion, fighting to the end, both 
convinced of the barbarity of the Red Am1y and aware that Germany's own 
genocides meant that their enemies would show no mercy to the Germans. 
IV. CONCLUSION: KATYN AND TI-IE "BLOODLANDS" 
After the Soviet rupture of relations with the Polish govemment, 
and with their creation of their own client government in exile, first in 
Moscow and in 1944, in Lublin, the story of the Katyn massacre entered 
into the text of the Cold War, perpetuati.."'l.g Goebbels's propaganda efforts 
after his death. At Soviet insistence, the Allies included the Katyn Massacre 
as a count in the indictment of the Germans at the Trial of the Major War 
C1iminals before the Intemational Mi1itmy Tribunal at Nuremberg. 52 Cold 
47 
Vojtech Mastny, Stalin and the Prospects of a Separate Peace in World War 11, 77 Alv1. 
HlsT. REv. 1365, 1376-77 (1972). 
48 Fox, supra note 3, at 496. 
49 
See id. at 467 (discussing how German rule, although harsh, was still preferable to the 
tyranny of Soviet rule in Poland). 
50 Weber, supra note 3, at 233. 
51 
RICHARD BESSEL, GERMANY 1945: FROM WAR TO PEACE ]j (2009). 
52 
See EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OF THE GERMANS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE TWENTY-
TWO DEFENDANTS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL AT NUREMBURG 608 
(1966). 
2012] MASS MURDERERS DISCOVER MASS MURDER 589 
War politics motivated the investigation by the Madden Committee of the 
U.S. House of Representatives in 1952, which only confmned the fmdings 
already published in the German Foreign Office publication from 1943.53 
From time to time between 1949 and 1989, Katyn arose as an irritant 
between the newly democratic Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet 
Union or Poland. 54 
The very farrago of propaganda-lies received as truth and truth 
dismissed as lies-that clouded the view of Katyn in 1943 and extended 
through much of the Cold War exemplifies the complexity that Timothy 
Snyder argues has blurred historians' vision of the experiences of the 
"bloodlands" until the very recent past. 55 As the shackles of the Cold War 
now recede more than two decades into the past, it is incumbent upon 
lawyers, historians, and statesmen alike to tell the story of the Katyn 
Massacre in its fullest and richest context, as a matter of restorative justice 
and mastery of the past, as our contribution to efforts to ensure that no 
bloodlands agaiil blight the face of Europe. 
53 KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 30, at 235-39 
54 Hans Thieme, Katyn: Ein Geheimnis? [Katyn: A Secret?], 3 VIERTEUAHRSHEFTE FOR 
ZEITGESCHJCIITE [CONTEMP. HIST. Q.] 409, 411 (1955) (taking to task another German histo-
rian for referring to Katyn as "to this day not fully explained" and which ''unbiased historians 
confront with perplexity"); Elke Frohlich, Katyn in neuem Licht? Goebbels und der Mord an 
den polnischen Offizieren im 2 Weltkrieg [Katyn in a New Light? Goebbels and the Murder 
of Polish Officers in the Second World War] 37 GESCHJCIITE IN W!SSENSCHAFT UND 
UNTERRICIIT [HisT. REs. & INSTRUCTION] 234 {1986) {Protesting the inscription on a Warsaw 
monument to the Katyn victims as "Victims of Hitler's Fascism"). lndeed, the U.S. govern-
ment, from 1945 to 1961, operated a German Military History Program, employing German 
military officers who had served in the Wehrmacht, to write the history of units, actions, and 
tactics of fighting the Red Army. Members of this program quite naturally devoted their 
efforts to justifying and defending their actions during the war, and one of its products was a 
history by Major General Rudolf von Gersdorff, the Army Group Central Staff general in 
command of the Katyn investigation, called The Truth about Katyn, devoted to refuting the 
Soviet accusation that the Germans had massacred the Polish officers. James A. Wood, Cap-
tive Historians, Captive Audience: The Gennan Military Program, 1945-1961, 69 J. MIL. 
HIST. 123, 136 {2005). 
55 See generally SNYDER, supra note 6 
